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One who performs an act is ordinarily under a duty to act carefully.
When the defendant has acted there is seldom a problem regarding
the duty to use care. But when the defendant has failed to act the
question of duty raises a substantial problem.' The rule is stated that
there is no duty to act, but the exceptions are many. One arises when
there is a particular relationship between the parties; another, when
the defendant had commenced to act. Both exceptions are involved
in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton.2 Plaintiff had been
subject to a mustard gas attack in the war, incurring a spot on
his lungs. While working as an employee for defendant he had sev-
eral X-rays made. They showed the spot and also indicated an arrested
case of tuberculosis. The doctor in defendant's employ informed plain-
tiff of the spot but there was a conflict in testimony as to whether he
mentioned the arrested tuberculosis. After plaintiff left defendant's
employ, he was ill. Apparently his doctor then would have had an
X-ray made except that plaintiff told the doctor that he had been
X-rayed by defendant and found all right. The tuberculosis had
become active and he was seriously disabled. A jury verdict for
plaintiff was regarded as indicating that defendant failed to inform
plaintiff of the tubercular condition and as covering the issues of
proximate cause and contributory negligence and the court felt that
its task was to determine whether there was a duty to disclose. It
held that there was. The relationship of employer and employee has
been held to be sufficient basis for the duty to act under certain cir-
cumstances but not to this extent. The act of taking the X-rays might
be regarded as an undertaking, imposing liability for acting negli-
gently or for leaving plaintiff in a worse condition than before the
undertaking, but the cases are few where the undertaking imposes
liability for failure to carry it out without more. Here the combina-
tion of the two was held sufficient, with the greater emphasis on the
concept of the undertaking; and the verdict for the plaintiff was
affirmed.
* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 38 (2d ed. 1955).
2. 237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956), 10 VAND. L. REV. 622 (1957).
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Breach of Duty
The issue of breach of duty is normally for the jury to decide.
3 It is
submitted to the jury in terms of a standard of what a reasonable,
prudent man would do under the same or similar circumstances.
Sometimes the phrase "same or similar circumstances" is felt not to
be adequate, and particular circumstances are specifically set out in
the instruction. This is true, for example, of the situation where the
defendant is acting in an emergency situation, and the so-called
"sudden emergency doctrine" has developed.4 It was held proper in
another case to instruct that a driver must take into consideration
that the road was wet and not necessary to add that he must take
into account that he could not stop his car as readily as on a dry road.5
The fact that one is dealing with children is another circumstance
which may be specifically mentioned. Thus, in Bradshaw v. Holt6
the court held that the driver of a car must take into consideration
the irresponsibility of children and explained that it was a "jury
question as to whether Bradshaw was guilty of negligence (1) in not
placing his car under such control as was necessary to avoid any col-
lision that the known childish impulses of this child of such tender
years might render probable, or (2) in assuming that such child would
stand on the side of the highway without attempting to cross until
Bradshaw's very swiftly moving automobile should pass.' 7
Negligence per se: A criminal statute may sometimes lay down a
specific rule of conduct. This rule of conduct may then be taken by
the courts in a negligence case as supplanting the general standard of
care, in which case the jury are instructed that the violation of the
rule constitutes negligence per se. Thus, in Hammonds v. Mansfield8
3. Thus, in a number of cases the issue was held to have been properly left
to the jury. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Simpson, 242 F.2d 734 (6th Cir. 1957); City
of Winchester v. Finchum, 301 S.W.2d 341 (Tenn. 1957); Dixon Stave
Heading Co. v. Archer, 291 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956); McAmis v.
Carlisle, 300 S.W.2d 59 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956); Moore v. Watkins, 293 S.W.2d
185 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956); Kendall Oil Co. v. Payne, 293 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn.
App. E.S. 1955). In others it was held that the issue should have been left to
the jury and a directed verdict was improper. See, e.g., Coatney v. Southwest
Tenn. Elec. Membership Corp., 292 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956); Thur-
man v. Southern Ry., 293 S.W.2d 600 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956); Boyce v. Shank-
man, 292 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
However, the facts may- be so clear that the jury could reasonably reach
only one result, in which case a directed verdict should be given. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Johnson City, 292 S.W.2d 794 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956); Hooper v.
Starkey, 297 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956); Chattanooga v. Shackleford,
298 S.W.2d 743 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
4. An instruction regarding the "doctrine" was sustained in Hammonds v.
Mansfield, 296 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955); see also Womac v. Casteel,
292 S.W.2d 782 (Tenn. 1956).
5. Kunk v. Howell, 289 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
6. 292 S.W.2d 30 (Tenn. 1956).
7. Id. at 33.
8. 296 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
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violation of the statute requiring good brakes was held to constitute
negligence per se, and the statute was construed to render it unneces-
sary that the defendant know that the brakes were defective. "The
statute is both penal and peremptory in its requirement and one who
violates it and causes injury to another should affirmatively remove
any imputation of negligence in failing to discover the defect."9 The
doctrine was raised in several other cases. In one case the statute was
held not to have been violated.'0 In two cases the issue was whether
the injury sustained was within the purpose for which the ordinance
was passed."
The contention was made in three cases that the National Electric
Safety Code should be treated in a similar fashion, as laying down a
specific rule of conduct replacing the general standard.12 All three
cases agreed, however, that the "Code" was not to be treated as the
equivalent of a statute or ordinance, and that while its provisions were
appropriate for evidence they should not be controlling on the jury.
Proof of Negligence: Since breach of duty, or negligence, is treated
as an issue of fact, it can be proved by direct or circumstantial evi-
dence, like other fact issues. In malpractice cases, however, it is usu-
ally held that ordinary evidence is not sufficient and that professional
or expert testimony is required to permit the jury to find negligence.
This rule was urged by the defendant in Rural Educ. Ass'n v. Bush.13
The alleged negligence, in this case, however, was sewing up a sponge
in plaintiff's abdomen, and the court held that expert evidence was
not necessary to establish negligence under these circumstances. "Any
layman would know that fact." The court was of course relying on
circumstantial evidence, and this is one of the classic instances of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Res ipsa loquitur was the subject of extended discussion in Coca Cola
9. Id. at 659.
10. Merck & Co. v. Kidd, 242 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1957). Defendant manu-
factured blood plasma which had hepatitis virus. This was held not to be in
violation of the Tennessee Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act prohibiting the manu-
facture or sale of drugs containing "any filthy, putrid or decomposed sub-
stance." TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-115 (1956).
11. City of Winchester v. Finchum, 301 S.W.2d 341 (Tenn. 1957) (ordinance
prohibiting bicycles on sidewalks); Murray v. Nashville, 299 S.W.2d 859 (Tenn.
App.. M.S. 1956) (marked crosswalk ordinance). Both cases involved con-
tributory negligence. See also McKamey v. Andrews, 289 S.W.2d 704 (Tenn.
App. E.S. 1955) (yielding right of way to vehicle in "favored thoroughfare");
Spence v. Came, 292 S.W.2d 438 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954) (municipal or-
dinances).
12. Kingsport Util. v. Brown, 299 S.W.2d 656 (Tenn. 1957); Chattanooga
v. Rogers, 299 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. 1956); Coatney v. Southwest Tennessee
Elec. Membership Corp., 292 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956). In all three
cases defendants claimed compliance with the terms of the "Code" as conclu-
sive indication of due care. This would not necessarily be true even if the
"Code" were treated as a statute; under certain circumstances one may be
negligent in driving 29 miles per hour in a statutory 30-mile zone.
13. 298 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
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Bottling Works, Inc. v. Crow.14 Plaintiff's eye was injured when a
Coca Cola bottle exploded. He had purchased a case of the bottles
from a retail merchant, Havener, to whom the bottles had been de-
livered by defendant company. While in Havener's possession they
had been under a counter, where they were under the observation of
the owner and his son. Plaintiff took them to his truck and carried
them a half mile away, where he placed them in a tub of crushed ice
with other soft drinks. When plaintiff reached for a bottle 30 minutes
later, a bottle of Coca Cola exploded, causing the injury. The trial
court, submitted the case to the jury, and while the court of appeals
reversed a verdict for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court reinstated the
verdict, holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable.
There was little difficulty in taking the position that the bottle would
not normally have exploded in the absence of negligence, and the
problem came in identifying that negligence with the defendant.
In the earlier case of Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan,15 involving
a foreign body in the bottle, the Supreme Court had held that it must
be shown by a clear preponderance of the evidence that there was
no reasonable opportunity for the bottle to have been tampered with,
in order for the case to go to the jury on the basis of res ipsa loquitur.
While the court in the instant case holds that this requirement of a
higher measure of proof is met, its general treatment indicates a
relaxation of the requirement. 16 This special type of proof is not
required in the great majority of jurisdictions and even in Tennessee
it has been peculiar to the bottled drink cases.' 7 Perhaps in the future
it will be-sufficient for the plaintiff simply to introduce sufficient evi-
dence to allow the jury reasonably to find that the bottle had not been
tampered with by a third person, so that the inferred negligence can
be regarded as that of the defendant. 18
Two other cases should be considered on the subject of circum-
stantial evidence. In Moore v. Watkins 9 and Ross v. Griggs20 the
facts were remarkably similar. Two young men were in each car,
14. 291 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 1956), 24 TENN. L. REv. 1219 (1957).
15. 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W.2d 721, 171 A.L.R. 1200 (1942).
16. The court speaks of the evidence eliminating "the probability of any
tampering with" the bottle; the Sullivan test would apparently have required
the "clear" elimination of any "possibility."
17. See DICKERSON, PRODUCTs LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CoNsulVm § 2.10 (1951);
Wade, Book Review, 22 TENN. L. REV. 444, 446 (1952).
18. It is possible to distinguish the Sullivan case on the element of damages.
That case involved a foreign substance in the bottle, and the physical illness
as a result could easily be faked, a matter which clearly bothered the court.
In the instant case, the explosion was unquestioned, and both it and the
physical damage to the eye were seen by several witnesses. While the
court in the instant case declines to accept the distinction, it is a practical one
which may well be important in future cases. When plaintiff's "injury" is
doubtful the requirement in the Sullivan case may still be imposed.
19. 293 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
20. 296 S.W.2d 641 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955), 24 TENN. L. REv. 1217 (1957).
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which was apparently going at an extreme speed and failed to make
a sharp turn and crashed against a tree, "jackknifing" against it and
coming down at a different angle. Both young men were killed in
each instance. Although there were no witnesses, the circumstances
clearly indicated negligent driving at an unreasonable speed. The
big question in each case therefore was not one of whether the driver
was negligent but one of who was the driver. In each case the court,
held that it would be possible for the jury to infer that the owner was
driving. He had been originally driving in both cases and the position
of the bodies in the car and on the ground was held to permit the
inference-a somewhat tenuous one in each case.2 1
Causation
The element of "proximate cause" in a negligence case usually in-
cludes both cause in fact and legal cause. Cause in fact-whether
defendant's negligence actually caused, or was a substantial factor in
causing, the plaintiff's injury-is an issue for the jury to determine.
Thus, in Illinois Central R.R. v. Exum2 2 the issue was whether the fire
which burned the plaintiff's buildings was started by defendant rail-
road. There was conflicting evidence, and the jury verdict for the
plaintiff was allowed to stand. Again, in Coatney v. Southwest Ten-
nessee Elec. Membership Corp.,2 the issue was whether the purported
negligence of defendant in allowing an electric wire to sag was a
cause in fact of its coming in contact with a portable antenna. The
court held that this was a question for the jury, rather than for the
trial judge.2
Legal cause involves the decision of whether the liability should be
cut off despite the presence of a cause-in-fact relationship for reasons
of policy or because the relationship between the negligence and the
injury is not reasonably close. This is sometimes left to the jury,
sometimes decided by the court as a matter of law. In Chattanooga
v. Rogers,25 where both cause in fact and legal cause were involved, the
determination was left to the jury. Electricity was transmitted (by
contact or by arc) from defendant's high tension wires to a building
crane operated by a third person. It went through the crane, killing
the deceased, a workman. Defendant contended that the action of the
21. Both cases relied on the holding in the recent case of Burkett v. Johnson,
282 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955), which involved similar facts. See dis-
cussion in Wade, Torts-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1138-39
(1956).
22. 296 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
23. 292 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
24. See also McKamey v. Andrews, 289 S.W.2d 704 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955),
where there was some discussion of the question of whether an automobile
accident could be regarded as the cause, some time later, of a stroke in a
woman who had high blood pressure and arteriosclerosis.
25. 299 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. 1956).
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crane operator constituted an intervening cause. Said the court,
through Justice Burnett:
The question of the proximate cause of the accident, the crane coming
into too close proximity to the wires or the lowness of the uninsulated
wires, generally presents a question of fact. The mere fact that active
intervening cause is so vehemently and forcefully argued and can be
argued as the cause of an accident seems to us one of the strongest reasons
of why this question should be submitted to a jury if there is any evi-
dence of negligence on the part of two or more parties which might cause
the injuries. In this case clearly there was a dispute on material facts
as to whether or not the erection and leaving these uninsulated wires
at the height that they were was negligence on the part of the City or
whether or not the crane operator who was handling his crane or whether
they came in contact with the wires or whether the current jumped from
the wires onto the crane, was all disputed and under such a situation if
the minds of reasonable men might differ as to the conclusion to be drawn
from these facts (clearly they might do so here) then there is presented a
jury question.26
Where negligence per se is involved because of violation of a statute
or ordinance, causation questions are often handled most aptly by
determining whether the injury came within the group of hazards
which the statute was intended to protect against. This approach
was used in two cases where the plaintiff violated a municipal ordi-
nance.27
Damages
Under our decisions no mathematical rules of computation have ever
been formulated making verdicts and judgments uniform in negligence
cases. It is the duty of the courts to take into consideration the nature
and extent of the injuries, the suffering, expenses, diminution of earning
capacity, inflation and high cost of living, age, expectancy of life and
amount awarded in other similar cases.
This apt and concise listing of the elements to be taken into consid-
eration in assessing damages is from Management Services, Inc. v.
Hellman.28 The case involved death of an eight-year-old boy and con-
tains further consideration of the elements of damage in a wrongful
death case. A $35,000 jury verdict for which the trial judge ordered
a remittitur of $5,000 was affirmed.29
26. Id. at 664. See also Pierce v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Tenn.
1955); Bradshaw v. Holt, 292 S.W.2d 30 (Tenn. 1956).
27. City of Winchester v. Finchum, 301 S.W.2d 341 (Tenn. 1957) (ordinance
prohibiting use of bicycles on sidewalk not intended to protect against danger-
ous condition of sidewalk); Murray v. Nashville, 299 S.W.2d 859 (Tenn. App.
M.S. 1956) (cross-walk ordinance intended to protect against vehicular traffic
hazards but other hazards as well).
28. 289 S.W.2d 711, 722 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
29. On remittiturs, see Comment, 24 TENN. L. Rsv. 1155 (1957).
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Bradshaw v. Holt3 is another wrongful death case involving a five-
year-old boy. It was held erroneous for the trial court, "after correctly
charging the formula applicable in ascertaining damages," to add,
"that the loss of services during the child's minority is another element
to consider." But the court held that since the jury verdict was for
only $5000, the error was not prejudicial, since "the value of the life
of the child was not less than" this. In another case $21,900 for death
of a nineteen-year-old boy was held not excessive.31
In Harber v. Smith,32 the trial judge's order of remittitur of $3000
on a jury verdict of $6000 for personal injuries was set aside by the
court of appeals. Five hundred dollars for a dog killed by a truck
was held not excessive33 and $15,000 was held not excessive in a case




Contributory negligence, like defendant's negligence, is normally
a question for the jury to determine.35 Sometimes, however, a plain-
tiff's conduct is so obviously negligent that the court rules to this
effect as a matter of law.36 Whether the contributory negligence was
a proximate cause of the injury was submitted to the jury in Kendall
Oil Co. v. Payne.37 If it is not a proximate cause, under the Tennessee
doctrine of remote contributory negligence, it does not bar recovery
but merely mitigates damages.38 Plaintiff's violation of an ordinance
was held not to bar recovery in one case because the injury was not
one of the hazards within the scope of purpose of the ordinance. 39
The doctrine of last clear chance was discussed in Kunk v. Howell.
40
Normally this doctrine is used as a method for avoiding the harsh-
ness of the contributory negligence rule. When the plaintiff, even
though negligent, no longer had an opportunity to avoid the accident,
and the defendant still had a "last clear chance" to do so, the plaintiff
30. 292 S.W.2d 30, 35 (Tenn. 1956).
31. Kunk v. Howell, 289 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
32. 292 S.W.2d 468 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
33. McAmis v. Carlisle, 300 S.W.2d 59 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
34. Rural Educ. Ass'n v. Bush, 298 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
35. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Holt, 292 S.W.2d 30 (Tenn. 1956); Howell v.
Wallace E. Johnson, Inc., 298 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956); Tschumi v.
Bradley, 296 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956); Kendall Oil Co. v. Payne,
293 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955); cf. McLellan Stores Co. v. Weaver, 238
F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1956) (trial before judge without jury).
36. See Chattanooga v. Shackleford, 298 S.W.2d 743 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
37. 293 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
38. See De Rossett v. Malone, 34 Tenn. App. 451, 239 S.W.2d 366 (W.S.
1950).; Wade, Torts-1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VATD. L. Rsv. 990, 1003-04
(1953).
39. City of Winchester v. Finchum, 301 S.W.2d 341 (Tenn. 1957); cf. Murray
v. Nashville, 299 S.W.2d 859 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
40. 289 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
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has been allowed to recover.41 In the Kunk case, however, it was held
suitable for the trial judge to instruct that the doctrine may apply in
favor of the defendant as "a defensive weapon," since "the doctrine
is but a phase of proximate cause." If the plaintiff had the last clear
chance then the defendant did not and plaintiff's contributory neg-
ligence bars recovery under the general rule. Under ordinary circum-
stances it would seem less confusing to avoid use of the language of
last clear chance for the benefit of the defendant when the statement
of the contributory negligence rule will be clear enough to the jury.2
Two cases held that an automobile driver's negligence is not imputed
to his guest but that the guest may himself be contributorily negligent
and may thus be barred from recovery for this reason.
43
In two cases involving landowner's liability to an invitee, the court
explained that "he is not liable for injuries sustained from dangers
that are obvious, reasonably apparent or as well known to the invitee
as the owner."44 They add the corollary that the invitee assumes the
risk of all obvious and known dangers.
45
Particular Relationships
1. Traffic and Transportation
Automobiles: There were more cases in the field of automobile ac-
cidents than in any other. Most of these concerned collisions-between
two cars,46 between a car and a truck4 7 or between three cars.48 There
was a crossing collision with a train in one case.49 In other cases a
41. See PRossER, TORTS § 52 (2d ed. 1955); Wade, Torts-1954 Tennessee
Survey, 7 VAND. L. REv. 951, 960-61 (1954).
42. Perhaps in the Kunk case the fact that there were two defendants in-
volved in a three-car collision provided more reason for speaking about last
clear chance in connection with one of them, but even here the jury could
probably understand the issues better in terms of negligence and contributory
negligence. In general, see Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 543 (1953), cited by the court.
43. Santi v. Duffey, 290 S.W.2d 884 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956); Howell v.
Wallace E. Johnson, Inc., 298 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
44. Kendall Oil Co. v. Payne, 293 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955)
(service station); Evans v. Nashville Union Stockyards, 292 S.W.2d 521
(Tenn. App. M.S. 1956) (stockyards).
45. Assumption of risk is mentioned also in Pierce v. United States, 142
F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
46. McKamey v. Andrews, 289 S.W.2d 704 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955) (one car
pulled out of driveway onto main thoroughfare); Spence v. Came, 292 S.W.2d
438 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954) (intersection collision).
47. Santi v. Duffey, 290 S.W.2d 884 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956) (intersection);
Dixon Stave & Heading Co. v. Archer, 291 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1956); Long v. Kirby-Smith, 292 S.W.2d 216 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956) (truck
parked over crest of hill); Harber v. Smith, 292 S.W.2d 468 (Tenn. App. M.S.
1956).
48. Kunk v. Howell, 289 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956) (one defendant,
losing control, crossed over and hit plaintiff; then, other defendant, behind
plaintiff, hit him); Womac v. Casteel, 292 S.W.2d 782 (Tenn. 1956) (one car
driver tried to pass another car, which would not let him back in lane when
he could not make it).
49. Southern Ry. v. Maples, 296 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. 1956).
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car hit a pedestrian,50 a bicycle5' or a dog.52 In two cases the car
failed to make a curve, crashed into a tree and killed both occupants. 53
There were other cases involving upsets.54 Significant holdings of
these cases were discussed in the general treatment of negligence.
Railroads: In Southern Ry. v. Cradic,55 plaintiff, walking along a
railroad track, was half way across a trestle when a train came along.
He swung over the side of the trestle, but his hold was knocked loose
by the vibrations and he fell some 35 feet, suffering serious injuries.
He testified that it was a clear day and no bell or whistle was sounded.
Defendant's evidence was to the effect that there was a heavy fog and
that a warning was sounded. A jury verdict for plaintiff was affirmed.
The court explained that under the Railroad Precautions Statute, 0
the railroad was required to keep a lookout, and when a person ap-
peared on the tracks, to sound the alarm and use every possible means
to stop the train; and the jury might have found that if this had been
done, plaintiff could have gotten over the trestle in time. The fact
that he was a trespasser on the track was immaterial to liability
under the Precautions Statute.
In a highway-crossing collision a jury verdict for the plaintiff was
sustained on the ground that the defendant railroad breached its
duty to keep the crossings in safe repair.57 Two other cases involving
railroads do not raise traffic matters. One involved a fire, found by
the jury to have been started by the defendant, 58 and the other was
an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.59
Aircraft: A new statute makes the owner and pilot of an aircraft
"liable for injuries or damage to persons or property on the land
or water beneath, caused by the ascent, descent, or flight of the air-
craft, or the dropping or falling of any objects therefrom in accord-
ance with the rules of law applicable to torts in this State."60
50. Bradshaw v. Holt, 292 S.W.2d 30 (Tenn. 1956) (little boy ran across
highway); Hooper v. Starkey, 297 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956) (pedes-
trian on highway). In Hammonds v. Mansfield, 296 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1955), three plaintiffs were hit as they walked up the steps of a school
house.
51. Parrish v. Yeiser, 298 S.W.2d 556 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
52. McAmis v. Carlisle, 300 S.W.2d 59 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
53. Moore v. Watkins, 293 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956); Ross v.
Griggs, 296 S.W.2d 641 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955), 24 TENN. L. REV. 1217 (1957).
54. Christofiel v. Johnson, 290 S.W.2d 215 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956); Wyatt v.
Lassiter, 299 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
55. 301 S.W.2d 374 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
56. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-1208(4) (1956).
57. Southern Ry. v. Maples, 296 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. 1956).
58. Illinois Central R.R. v. Exum, 296 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
59. Thurmer v. Southern Ry., 293 S.W.2d 600 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
60. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 325, amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 42-105 (1956),
which formerly imposed absolute liability on the owner. The act also provides
that the person in whose name the aircraft is registered with the United States
Department of Commerce or Aeronautics Commission shall be prima facie the
owner of the aircraft.
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Streets and Highways: The city's duty to use care to keep its streets
and sidewalks in safe condition was involved in two cases. In City of
Winchester v. Finchum6' the city was held liable to a girl on a bicycle
for a defect in the sidewalk despite an ordinance prohibiting riding of
bicycles on the sidewalk. "The City was not bound to keep its side-
walks safe for bicyclists, but was bound to keep them reasonably safe
for pedestrians-bound to maintain such walks against defects which
were so dangerous that they might reasonably be expected to cause
injury to pedestrians; and it was liable for a breach of this duty caus-
ing injury to a user of the sidewalk, whether such user was a pedes-
trian or a bicyclist.
'62
In Murray v. Nashville,63 plaintiff, an eighty-eight-year-old man, fell
while crossing the street. There was in the vicinity a slight ditch, not
more than one and one-half inches deep. Even assuming that this
played a part in causing the fall, the court held that the jury verdict
for the defendant should be sustained because the existence of such.
trivial depressions would not constitute actionable negligence. In
addition the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in crossing at a
place other than the marked crosswalk.
In Howell v. Wallace E. Johnson, Inc.,64 the developer of a subdivi-
sion who had not turned the roads over to the city was held responsible
for their condition if they were not barricaded from the public. South-
ern Ry. v. Maples65 indicates that both the municipality and the rail-
road may be responsible for the defective condition of a crossing.
Blocking or rendering unsafe a passageway or highway may cause
liability to a person injured as a result.66
Carriers: In Frye v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,67 plaintiff shipped
a valuable dog by defendant express company, and the dog escaped
before delivery to the consignee. The, court reversed a directed ver-
dict for defendant, holding that the jury might find negligence in
allowing it to escape.
2. Electric Utilities
There were six cases during the period involving death or injury
from high-tension electric lines.6 Half produced death, and half pro-
61. 301 S.W.2d 341 (Tenn. 1957).
62. Id. at 344.
63. 299 S.W.2d 859 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
64. 298 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
65. 296 S.W.2d 870 (Term. 1956).
66. Tschumi v. Bradley, 296 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956) (garbage
cans and garbage in public passageway); cf. Wyatt v. Lassiter, 299 S.W.2d 229
(Tenn. App. W.S. 1956) (clay on highway).
67. 296 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
68. Pierce v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); Chattanooga
v. Rogers, 299 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. 1956); Coatney v. Southwest Tennessee Elec.
Membership Corp., 292 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956); Johnson v. John-
son City, 292 S.W.2d 794 (Term. App. E.S. 1956); Chattanooga v. Shackleford,
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duced serious injuries.70 Contact with the wires (or sufficiently close
proximity to produce an electric arc) came about by means of a
crane,7 ' a portable television antenna,7 2 a long gutter,7 3 and by direct
contact. 74 The plaintiff recovered in three cases,7 5 one case was re-
versed to go back for a jury trial,76 and a directed verdict for defend-
ant was held proper in two cases.7 7 In the last two cases, the plaintiff
was also held contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
There is agreement that compliance by the utility with the provi-
sions of the National Electric Safety Code does not constitute conclu-
sive evidence of due care, though it is appropriate evidence for
consideration by the jury.
7 8
The possible negligence on the part of the defendant in one case
involved inadequate checking to see whether the electricity was cut
off.79 In two cases it involved the height and location of the wires.80
The most significant decision was the latest one decided by the Su-
preme Court-Kingsport Util., Inc. v. Brown.81 The court there held
that it was a question of fact for the jury whether "a utility is negli-
gent in having such high-powered voltage in lines uninsulated, run-
ning through the business section of towns. Of course the law does
not require that all lines be insulated at any particular place but
only where persons are likely to be and have a right to be, for business,
298 S.W.2d 743 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956); Kingsport Util., Inc. v. Brown, 299
S.W.2d 656 (Tenn. 1955). The Coatney and Johnson cases are discussed to-
gether in 24 TENx. L. REV. 1059 (1957); cf. 9 VAND. L. REV. 890 (1956).
69. Coatney v. Southwest Tennessee Elec. Membership Corp., supra note 68;
Chattanooga v. Rogers, supra note 68; Chattanooga v. Shackleford, supra
note 68.
70. Pierce v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); Johnson v.
Johnson City, 292 S.W.2d 794 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956); Kingsport Util., Inc. v.
Brown, 299 S.W.2d 656 (Tenn. 1955).
71. Kingsport Util., Inc. v. Brown, supra note 70; Chattanooga v. Rogers,
299 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. 1956).
72. Coatney v. Southwest Tennessee Elec. Membership Corp., 292 S.W.2d 420
(Tenn. App. W.S. 1956); Johnson v. Johnson City, 292 S.W.2d 794 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1956).
73. Chattanooga v. Shackleford, 298 S.W.2d 743 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
74. Pierce v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
75. Pierce v. United States, supra note 74; Chattanooga v. Rogers, 299 S.W.2d
660 (Tenn. 1956); Kingsport Util., Inc. v. Brown, supra note 70.
76. Coatney v. Southwest Tennessee Elec. Membership Corp., 292 S.W.2d
420 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
77. Johnson v. Johnson City, 292 S.W.2d 794 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956); (given
in court below), Chattanooga v. Shackleford, 298 S.W.2d 743 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1956) (reversing a jury verdict for plaintiff).
78. Chattanooga v. Rogers, 299 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. 1956); Coatney v. South-
west Tennessee Elec. Membership Corp., 292 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1956); Kingsport Util., Inc. v. Brown, 299 S.W.2d 656 (Tenn. 1955).
79. Pierce v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
80. In Chattanooga v. Rogers, 299 S.W.2d 66 (Tenn. 1956) there was involved
height and proximity to a building; in Coatney v. Southwest Tennessee Elec.
Membership Corp., 292 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956) there was involved
height, sagging and location over private property.
81. 299 S.W.2d 656 (Tenn. 1955).
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pleasure or otherwise."82 To the defendant's argument (and that of
Knoxville, Nashville and Memphis, as amici curiae) that this would
add greatly to the cost of supplying electricity, the court replied
curtly: "When the likelihood of danger to human life is to be balanced
against the cost of insulation, we do not think the latter is a very good
argument."83
This holding is likely to constitute a new point of departure in the
electricity cases. Previously, the cases had based findings of negli-
gence on the height of the uninsulated wires or their proximity to
buildings or other objects. Now, apparently, it may be found negligent
merely to have uninsulated high-tension wires in certain areas. Will
the rule in this case be extended to well populated residential areas
as well as business sections?
3. Suppliers
Schaeffer v. Lindsey84 involves the liability of a bailor to a third
person for negligently entrusting a car to an incompetent person.
Hinkle, a salesman for Schaeffer, a used car dealer, was trying to sell
a car to Mrs. Morris. While the battery was being charged, Hinkle
left her with the car and went into the office to obtain a drive-out
slip. She apparently stepped on the starter, and the car, being in
gear, rolled backwards, hitting the plaintiff's small boy and crushing
him against a wall. Mrs. Morris did not know how to drive and there
was evidence that she was intoxicated. Hinkle made no attempt to
find out whether she was a competent driver. A jury verdict against
all three parties was affirmed on the ground that the jury could find
that it was negligence to leave the car in Mrs. Morris's control.
This case is to be contrasted with Parrish v. YeiserP Hugh Thomp-
son, eighteen, had had an automobile accident a month and a half
earlier and still had his face bandaged so that the vision in one eye
was obscured. He came with his father to defendant to buy a new
automobile. By the time the car was selected it was too late to com-
plete the required paper work, but defendant let Hugh have the car
anyway. Within fifteen minutes he had run over two boys on a
bicycle, killing them both. A directed verdict for defendant was
affirmed. While "the general rule is that one who furnishes or lends
his automobile to a known incompetent driver is liable for damages
to persons injured by the negligence of such incompetent driver,"8
defendant was held not to come within the rule. He knew only that
Hugh had been in a wreck before and had his eye bandaged, and the
82. Id. at 659.
83. Id. at 660. See, generally, Comment, High Tension Lines-Tort Liability,
24 TENN. L. REV. 362 (1956).
84. 297 S.W.2d 801 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
85. 298 S.W.2d 556 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
86. Id. at 560.
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court explained that the mere fact that a person has been in a wreck
is not proof of negligence or incompetence and that one-eyed persons
are allowed to drive.
In Harber v. Smith87 the family purpose doctrine was held not to
apply when a father allowed his son, on leave from the service, to take
the car one night. The doctrine was held to be inapplicable when the
members of the family must obtain special permission on each occasion
when they use the vehicle or when the vehicle is not maintained
wholly or partly to serve the convenience of the family.
McIntosh v. Goodwin88 repeats the rule, now well established in
Tennessee, that the vendor of a house is under no duty to the pur-
chaser to use care to see that it is in safe condition.89
Merck & Co. v. Kidd9O involves the liability of a manufacturer. The
product manufactured here was blood plasma. This plasma had
hepatitis virus in it and plaintiff contracted the disease. There is no
way of telling whether the germ is in the plasma or of sterilizing the
plasma to eliminate the germ. Plaintiff's original action had been on
the basis of common law negligence and breach of warranty, but he
dropped these tvio grounds and relied on the provision of the Tennes-
see Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act providing that a drug is adulterated
if it contains "any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance"91-con-
tending that this made the defendant negligent per se. A divided
court held that the virus did not come within the language of the
statute.
4. Landowners
Several cases involve the question of the duty of care owed by a
landowner (or possessor) to a business guest or invitee. In Manage-
ment Services, Inc. v. Hellman,92 a swimming pool operator was held
not to be an insurer but required to exercise due care to see that the
premises were safe. When a small rope blocking off a part of the
concrete apron was easily overlooked and apparently not marked,
the jury were permitted to find negligence in failing to warn of a
latent danger. Similarly, in McLellan Stores Co. v. Weaver,93 recovery
was permitted when a part of weighing scales protruded into the aisle
of a store in a fashion so as to create a hazard for customers. On the
other hand, if the danger is obvious, there may be no duty to take
87. 292 S.W.2d 468 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
88. 292 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
89. See Trautman and Kirby, Real Property-1954 Tennessee Survey. 7 VAND.
L. REV. 941, 930-34 (1954); Wade, Torts-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L.
REV. 951, 968-69 (1954); Note, Tort Liability of Vendor of Real Property,
24 TENN. L. REv. 1170 (1957).
90. 242 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1957).
91. TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-118(b) (1956).
92. 289 S.W.2d 711 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
93. 238 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1956).
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action. Thus, in Kendall Oil Co. v. Payne,94 defendant was washing
down the pavement at a service station. Plaintiff drove in and stopped.
When he got out, he slipped on the soapsuds and fell. Defendant's
negligence was held to be a matter for the jury. Said the court:
Liability is sustained on the ground of the owner's superior knowledge
of a perilous condition on his premises and he is not liable for injuries sus-
tained from dangers that are obvious, reasonably apparent or as well
known to the invitee as to the owner.... If the danger is so obvious that
a reasonable careful and prudent person would assume that an invitee
would become aware of it in time to avoid injury to himself there is no
duty to give warning of the danger.
95
Evans v. Nashville Union Stockyards9 illustrates the situation where
the danger was known to the invitee. Plaintiff was walking down a
stockyard passageway in which, as he knew from experience, cattle
were regularly driven. As one herd was going by, a steer broke away
and ran toward plaintiff; people shouted to him but he did not hear
and the steer ran into him and knocked him down. A directed verdict
for defendant was affirmed, on the ground that there was no duty
to protect him further.
In both of the last two cases, some courts would have explained
the result by talking in terms of assumption of risk by the invitee in
remaining there despite the known or obvious danger. This approach
was mentioned in the two cases, but the approach actually used is
more meaningful and helpful in reaching decisions.
The question of whether the plaintiff was an invitee or licensee was
presented in Crane Co. v. Simpson.97 Plaintiff's husband was an em-
ployee of an independent contractor engaged in installing an elevator
in a penthouse structure located on the roof of defendant's building.
He stepped outside the penthouse onto the roof for fresh air and
fell through a skylight so covered with dust that the glass could not
be observed. A jury verdict for plaintiff was affirmed, the court
indicating that it was for the jury to tell whether the husband had
become a mere licensee outside the penthouse.
To an unknown trespasser there is no duty owed to use care. But
under the Railroad Precautions Act,9 requiring a lookout, the court
held again in Southern Ry. v. Cradic99 that a duty is owed to persons
on the track or a trestle.
The landlord-tenant relationship was involved in two cases. In
Boyce v. Shankman,0 0 the tenant fell through a hole in the attic floor.
94. 293 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
95. Id. at 42, 43.
96. 292 S.W,2d 521 (Term. App. M.S. 1956).
97. 242 F.2d 734 (6th Cir. 1957).
98. TEN. COD, Awx. § 65-1208 (1956).
99. 301 S.W.2d 374 (Tern. App. E.S. 1956).
100. 292 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
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The landlord had covered it with black paper board when he enlarged
the attic floor for storage purposes and informed plaintiff that the
attic was safe. A directed verdict for defendant was reversed, the
question of negligence and contributory negligence being held for
the jury. This was in accord with the special Tennessee rule,10 1 but
the court would apparently find a jury question even under the
majority rule imposing liability only for known latent defects. Harris
v. Dobson-Tankard Co.10 2 involves the tort liability of the landlord
for wrongful eviction of the tenant.
5. Professional Negligence
Doctors: Three cases involve the negligence of a doctor-though
somewhat indirectly. In Rural Educ. Ass'n v. Bush,10 3 a surgeon sewed
up a sponge in a patient after an abdominal operation. The action
was against the hospital, and the court affirmed a jury verdict for
plaintiff on the ground that the surgeon was an agent of the hospital.
No professional expert evidence was held to be necessary to find the
doctor negligent since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied.
In Hall v. De Saussure,104 the defendant, performing a rhizotomy,
involving the clipping of certain nerves, also removed parts of some
vertebrae. The case turned on the issue of limitation of actions and
was sent back for a trial on the question of whether there had been a
concealment of the cause of action. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
Stapleton'0 5 involved the doctor's failure to notify plaintiff of arrested
tuberculosis as indicated in an X-ray negative. The employer was
held liable.
Public Officials: In Lowe v. Wright,0 5 one Parrish forged a deed
from Lowe and his wife. He apparently took another man whom he
identified as Lowe to defendant Robin, a notary public, and had the
deed acknowledged. Robin knew that Mrs. Lowe was not present,
and he apparently knew her. His failure to investigate and to deter-
mine that the deed was executed by both parties was held to amount
to negligence, rendering him liable.
Harris v. Dobson-Tankard Co. 0 7 involves the liability of the sheriff
(and his surety) for executing a writ of restitution in an unlawful
detainer action. The writ was invalid as to the plaintiff since she was
not a party to the action, but since it was valid on its face there was
101. See Wade, Torts-1955 Tennessee Survey, 8 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1142-43
(1955); Comment, Landlord and Tenant; Tort Liability in Tennessee, 23
TENN. L. REV. 219 (1954).
102. 298 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
103. 298 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
104. 297 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
105. 237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956).
106. 292 S.W.2d 413 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
107. 298 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
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no liability in merely executing it. The eviction took place, however,
while the plaintiff was away, and the sheriff and his agents moved
plaintiff's furniture out on the street just prior to a thunder shower.
The court held that they were under a duty to use care to protect
plaintiff's goods and the jury could find them guilty of negligence.
6. Other Relationships
Animals: A dog owner's liability for its attack on an invitee is in-
volved in Henry v. Roach.i 08 The court repeated the general rule that
the owner is not liable unless he has knowledge of the animal's vicious
tendency. It reversed a directed verdict for defendant, however, on
the ground that there was evidence to permit the jury to find both a
vicious tendency and scienter. In this connection it called attention
to what it called the anomaly that a different rule applies to livestock,
where knowledge of vicious habits is not required.1i 9
Shooting: In Goodrich v. Morgan,"i0 defendant caught a "peeping
tom" looking in her basement window. As he ran away she shot at
him. A bullet struck plaintiff's husband in the chest, wounding him
mortally. Defendant could not see the deceased on the sidewalk be-
cause of shrubbery. A directed verdict for defendant was reversed.
"The fact that the defendant was shooting at a fleeing criminal who
was guilty of a misdemeanor, does not exonerate her from the duty of
exercising ordinary care in shooting at [him].""' The jury might
find her guilty of negligence toward the deceased.
Fire: In Illinois Central R.R. v. Exum 1 2 a railroad was liable for
starting fire. It was held proper to instruct the jury that if there was a




A new statute provides that a merchant who has probable cause to
believe that a person has unlawfully taken goods and that he can
recover them, "may, for the purpose of attempting to effect such re-
covery, take the person into custody and detain him in a reasonable
manner for a reasonable length of time," without being "criminally or
civilly liable for false arrest, false imprisonment, or unlawful deten-
tion.",l"3
108. 293 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
109. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-101 (1956).
110. 291 S.W.2d 610 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
111. Id. at 614.
112. 296 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
113. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 164, TEN. COD. ANN. § 40-824 (Supp. 1957);
see Comment, Shoplifting in Tennessee, 24 TENN. L. REv. 1177 (1957).
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Defamation
Another new statute provides that commercial printers shall not
be liable for printing libellous matter which they have not "written,
edited or otherwise authored," unless the copy is libelous per se or
the printer "knew or in the exercise of ordinary care should have
known, of the falsity of the matter." To qualify for this immunity the
printer must require "the person furnishing such copy to place his
true name, address and organization represented, if any, on such
copy or in a permanent record book kept for such purpose, such
information to be available to the person allegedly libeled upon his
written request.""14
Malicious Prosecution
In Dunn v. Alabama Oil & Gas Co.,115 defendant had brought a bad-
check charge against the plaintiff's wife, who had given a check on
her savings account. The check was turned down for failure to
present the savings book, and the wife did not make it good because
it had been given in accordance with a contract between plaintiff and
defendant which had subsequently fallen through. Apparently suit
was to force her to pay the amount. The court held that a directed
verdict for defendant was improper since the jury might have found
both lack of probable cause and malice. "Malice may be inferred from
a motive to enforce payment of a debt or the doing of any other act
the prosecutor wants done.""16
In Devine v. Patteson,17 a jury verdict for plaintiff was affirmed on
the merits but reversed and sent back for a new trial on the damages,
which were held to be inadequate. Advice of the district attorney was
held not to be conclusive on the issue of probable cause if the advice
was not honestly sought under reasonable belief of guilt. Evidence
that defendant sought to compel plaintiff to transfer an interest to
him under threat of prosecution was pertinent; and the fact that the
defendant failed to testify was held to warrant an inference of bad
faith and want of probable cause.
Inducing Breach of Contract
Defendant was held not guilty of the tort of inducing breach of
contract in Decca Records, Inc. v. Republic Recording Co.1 8 because
the contract was found to be no longer binding and there was no
evidence that the defendant enticed the third party away.
Trover
Two trover cases are both concerned with the issue of damages.
114. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 240, TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-2608 (Supp. 1957).
115. 299 S.W.2d 25 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
116. Id. at 28.
117. 242 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1957).
118. 235 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1956).
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Cline v. Roundtreen 9 involved a shipment of steel which defendants
took without complying with the bill of lading. The court affirmed
the decision below, saying that damages are not rendered uncertain
because they cannot be calculated with absolute exactness. In Chap-
man & Dewey Lbr. Co. v. Tri-State Veneer & Plywood Co.,i20 involv-
ing the conversion of timber, the court applied the so-called harsh
rule of damages, the measure being the value of the logs at the time
of the sale rather than the stumpage value. This was because the
defendant in buying the logs had not made diligent inquiry or ob-




A new statute provides that any governmental agency or religious
organization can recover damages not to exceed $300 from the parents
of minor children who "maliciously or willfully destroy property"
of the plaintiff, but adds that there will be no recovery if the parent
"shows due care and diligence in his care and supervision of such
minor child."''
Another statute provides that the owner or pilot of an aircraft will
be liable for damages "caused by the ascent, descent, or flight of the
aircraft, or the dropping or falling of any objects therefrom in accord-
ance with the rules of law applicable to torts in this State."'' 2
Unclassified
In Stratton v. Conway,124 plaintiff brought an action against de-
fendant for lowering the value of his property by selling adjoining
property to a Negro. The Supreme Court affirmed the action of the
lower court in sustaining a demurrer to the declaration, saying the
injury, if any, was damnum absque injuria. It explained that every
person is entitled to make a reasonable use of his own property, and
added that "The test of the permissible use of one's own land is not
whether the use or the act causes injury to his neighbor's property,
or whether the injury was the natural consequence, or whether the
act is in the nature of a nuisance, but the inquiry is, was the act or
use a reasonable exercise of the dominion which the owner of property
has by virtue of his ownership over his property, having regard to all
interests affected, his own and those of his neighbors, and having in
view also, public policy."'' 2
119. 236 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1956).
120. 301 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1957).
121. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4528 (1956).
122. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 76, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1001 to -1003 (Supp.
1957).
123. Id. c. 325, amending TENN. CODE ANx. § 42-105 (1956), which previously
had imposed absolute liability on the owner.
124. 301 S.W.2d 332 (Tenn. 1957).
125. Id. at 334, quoting 3 Am. Jur., Adjoining Landowners § 3 (1936).
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The court found that there was no nuisance, citing Latchis v. John,126
holding that the erection of a fruit stand near plaintiff's property did
not create a nuisance. Would an allegation in the declaration that the
sale was solely for the purpose of injuring and annoying the plaintiff




Griffith v. Hurt'2 involves the question of joinder of parties-plain-
tiff. It was held that three downstream landowners could join to-
gether in an equity suit to obtain an injunction against polluting a
stream. They could not join together in a single action at law to
obtain damages, since their damages were separate. The Supreme
Court held that the suit for the injunction might be maintained but
that since the monetary damages were allowed only as an incident to
the equitable relief of injunction, there was a misjoinder of parties
as to this part of the action and a demurrer as to it should be sustained.
Day v. North Am. Rayon Corp.129 construes the Tennessee third-
party statute130 so as not to allow the original defendant to bring in
another party defendant if this would eliminate diversity of citizen-
ship and thus cause the federal district court to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction and therefore "delay the right of the original plaintiff."
The statute has now been repealed,131 however, and there is no longer
a third-party practice in Tennessee.
Releases
A release of one joint tortfeasor has the effect of releasing the
other. But this result does not follow when the plaintiff gives a
covenant not to sue. Two cases illustrated this last rule and applied it
though trial courts had entered orders dismissing the covenants "with
prejudice."'132
Limitation of Action
Hall v. De Saussure,133 a malpractice action, holds that the one-year
statute of limitations applies to all actions for personal injuries,
126. 117 Vt. 110, 85 A.2d 575, 32 A.L.R.2d 1203 (1952).
127. On spite fences, see PROSSER, TORTS §§ 412-13 (2d ed. 1955); cf. Holbrook
v. Morrison, 214 Mass. 209, 100 N.E. 1111 (1913) (defendant put up sign,
"For Sale. Best Offer from Colored Family"; dictum that plaintiff might re-
cover if sole purpose was to injure him). On the effect of malice, see Hatton
v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
128. 291 S.W.2d 271 (Tenn. 1956).
129. 140 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
130. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-120 (1956). See Sturdivant, Joint Tortfeasors in
Tennessee and the New Third-Party Statute, 8 VAND. L. REV. 69 (1955).
131. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 33.
132. Long v. Kirby-Smith, 292 S.W.2d 216 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956); Wyatt v.
Lassiter, 299 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
133. 297 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
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whether the action sounds in tort or contract. Mere ignorance and
failure of the plaintiff to discover the cause of action will not prevent
the running of the statute, but it does not run when the defendant
fraudulently concealed the existence of the action. The case was
sent back for submission to the jury on the issue of concealment.
In Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton,3 4 involving failure
of the defendant employer to disclose that X ray negatives indicated
arrested tuberculosis, the court held that there was no concealment
tolling the statute of limitations. It also held, however, that the duty
to disclose was a continuing duty, lasting as long as the employment
relation existed, and that the statute did not begin to run until the
employment relation was severed.
Declaratory 'Judgment
In Tennessee Farmers Mut. Co. v. Hammond135 an insurance com-
pany brought an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act to deter-
mine its liability, when recovery had been obtained against the in-
sured for more than the amount of the liability policy. The Supreme
Court approved the lower court's dismissal of the action, saying: "The
complainant by this suit anticipates that a tort action will be instituted
against it based upon its alleged lack of good faith in negotiating a
settlement, to Hammond's damage. In seeking a declaratory judgment,
the complainant would force the defendant into a forum, and at a
time of complainant's own choosing and compel him to litigate his
tort action in the Chancery Court. For this reason the Chancellor
was right in dismissing the complainant's bill.' '136
134. 237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956).
135. 290 S.W.2d 860 (Tenn. 1956).
136. Id. at 863.
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